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Impoundment of Funds
The Limits of Executive Power:
Impoundment of Funds
A major constitutional controversy has recently developed over President
Nixon's impoundment of billions of dollars' of congressionally approved
funds. The issue has sparked an acrimonious debate between the executive
and the Congress, and, increasingly, has found its way into the courts. More
importantly, it brings into question the continued vitality of the separation
of powers doctrine; a doctrine intended to prevent the accumulation of all
powers in the hands of any one branch, a situation which James Madison
viewed as "the very definition of tyranny."'2  Professor Philip Kurland, how-
ever, recently concluded that the separation of powers concept was on its
"sickbed" while another commentator observed that its principles have
been subverted. 4
Unfortunately, both commentators are correct. The years since Theo-
dore Roosevelt's presidency have witnessed a continual drive for executive
hegemony and its related congressional emasculation. Presidents have
taken on ever-greater powers while Congress' importance in governing the
nation has declined. This has occurred despite the founders' constitutional
scheme granting extensive and explicit powers to Congress but few def-
inite powers to the executive. The impoundment controversy, viewed
within this framework, is more than simply another battle between two co-
equal branches of government. If the executive is victorious in the present
battle over budgetary control, the drift toward an executive-dominated
government will be nearly complete, and the separation of powers concept
will be rendered practically meaningless.
I. Budget Authority and Impoundment
Amounts available for expenditure are termed budget authority, 5 and to
enact such authority Congress follows one of two methods. Traditionally,
Congress first enacts legislation authorizing a particular program and later
appropriates specific sums to be expended for the program. 6 An authorization
1. Estimates of the total amount of funds impounded fluctuate. See p. 361 and
notes 17-19 infra.
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 at 139 (R. Fairfield ed.) (J. Madison).
3. Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 DUKE L.J. 619, 621.
4. Forkosch, The Separation of Powers, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 529, 532 (1969).
5. BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FIscAL YEAR 1974, 315 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as 1974 BUDGET].
6. Id. at 323.
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alone is insufficient to enact budget authority. An impoundment occurs when
the executive refuses to spend the appropriated funds.
Other programs receive budget authority by a different procedure. As
in the traditional procedure, Congress first authorizes the program. Contract
authority is then issued to the applicable agency, granting it the authority to
incur obligations. However, contract authority does not authorize expendi-
tures. Payment of obligations must await a congressional appropriation,
which is uniformly given and which permits expenditure of funds to pay
the previously incurred obligations. 7 Funds for programs whose budget
authority is obtained by the contract authority process are impounded when
the executive fails to approve contracts for the total contract authority
approved by Congress.
Commentators differ in their definitions of impoundments. s An impound-
ment will be defined herein as any executive refusal to expend approved
budget authority which is contrary to the intention of Congress and not ex-
plicitly authorized by statute. Thus, not all refusals to spend may properly
be termed impoundments. Funds may be "reserved" i.e., not spent, in or-
der to provide for unforeseen occurrences which would otherwise create
a need for supplemental appropriations.9 Reservations may also be insti-
tuted to "effect savings whenever savings are made possible by or through
changes in requirements, greater efficiency of operations, or other develop-
ments subsequent to the date on which such appropriation was made avail-
able."' 0 In addition, many appropriations acts specifically provide that
the funds are available until expended, even if the expenditure does not
occur during the fiscal year in which the appropriation was enacted." In a
limited number of situations, therefore, an executive refusal to spend funds
is warranted by statute. Prior to 1969, the overwhelming majority of im-
poundments were enacted pursuant to statute. These situations, however,
are more correctly referred to as reservations of funds, rather than im-
poundments. A true impoundment controversy arises only when the fail-
ure to spend frustrates the intent of Congress and where no statute author-
izes a fund reservation.
7. ld. at 315-16.
8. See, b.g., Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue,
38 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 124 (1969); Miller, Presidential Power to Impound Appro-
priated Funds: An Exercise in Constitutional Decision-Making, 43 N. CAR. L. REV.
502, 511-12 (1965); Stassen, Separation of Powers and the Uncommon Defense: The
Case Against Impounding of Weapons Systems Appropriations, 57 GEO. L.J. 1159, 1163
n.22 (1969); Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1505 n.1 (1973); Note,
Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional Power, 82 YALE L.J.
1636 n.2 (1973).
9. The Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(1) (1970).
10. 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2) (1970).
11. 1974 BUDGET 316-17.
[Vol. 23:359
Impoundment of Funds
A. The Origin of the Current Dispute
The impoundment issue has recently been brought to the forefront for two
reasons: (1) The recent use of impounding as a tool to replace congres-
sional policy determinations with those of the executive; and (2) the con-
tinually increasing amounts of funds impounded since the Nixon Adminis-
tration took office in 1969.
Impounding funds is not a recent phenomenon;1 2 its modern day roots
lie in President Franklin Roosevelt's wartime administration.' 3  The ration-
ale then given leaned heavily on the powers of the President during war.14
Impoundments prior to 1969 generally involved defense programs and did
not spread to civilian spending.' 5 In contrast, "[an entirely different
situation has developed under the Nixon Administration . . . . [F]unds
have been withheld from domestic programs because the President consid-
ers those programs incompatible with his own set of budget priorities."' 6
Moreover, the Nixon Administration has impounded more funds than
any one previously. In 1971, impounded funds totaled nearly $12.8 bil-
lion.17  At the end of fiscal year 1973, the Office of Management and
Budget estimated that more than $7.7 billion was being impounded.' 8
It appears that this amount is greatly underestimated; the actual total
might reach $18 billion.' 9
This attempted expansion of presidential power has brought a response
from the judicial and legislative branches of the government. Congress has
12. Recent scholarship has demonstrated, however, that Administration claims that
President Jefferson impounded funds appropriated for 15 gunboats in 1803 is inac-
curate. See Joint Hearings on S. 373 Before the Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Impoundment
of Funds of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations and the Subcomm. on Sep-
aration of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 365
(1973) (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General) [hereinafter cited
as 1973 Hearings]. It appears that Jefferson merely delayed spending the funds for
a year. The appropriation was then spent on "models most approved by experience."
S. REP. No. 93-121, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-13 (1973).
13. The origins of the first modem impoundments are set forth in Williams, The
Impounding of Funds by the Bureau of the Budget, in 1973 Hearings 844.
14. See Church, Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: The Decline of Congres-
sional Control Over Executive Discretion, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1240, 1242 (1970).
15. Id. at 1243. Although Roosevelt impounded funds appropriated for domestic
public works programs, his goal was "to lessen inflationary pressures [during wartime]
and to check the diversion of scarce materials from defense production." Williams,
supra note 13, at 844.
16. L. FISHER, PRESIDENT & CONGRESS 125 (1972).
17. 1973 Hearings 877-79 (OMB, Amounts Withheld From Obligation by Agency
and Account (Feb. 1971)).
18. OMB, Report Under the Federal Impoundment and Information Act, 38 Fed.
Reg. 19581-602 (1973).
19. See H.R. REp. No. 93-336, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973).
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held hearings, 20 and has drafted and approved legislation 2 1 which attempts to
curtail and control executive impoundment. Of greater importance is that
the judicial branch has had to mediate the dispute between the executive and
Congress. In so doing, the courts surprised commentators 22 and executive of-
ficials23 who had prophesized that, for a variety of procedural reasons,
24
courts would decline jurisdiction and leave the impoundment question to
the two remaining branches to solve by the political process. 25 Federal
courts have overruled executive impoundments in twenty-seven 26 of thirty-
20. See, e.g., 1973 Hearings; Hearings on the Termination and Cutbacks by the
Administration of Farm and Rural Programs Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture
and Forestry, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on H.R. 5193 and Related Bills
Before the Comm. on Rules of the House of Representatives on Impoundment Report-
ing and Review, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on Executive Impoundment
of Appropriated Funds Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971
Hearings].
21. S. 373, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) passed by Senate, 119 CONG. REC. S 12169,
S 12220 (daily ed. June 27, 1973); H.R. 8480, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) passed
by House, 119 CONG. REC. H 6597, H 6626 (daily ed. July 25, 1973); S 2027, 92d Cong.
1st Sess. (1971), 117 CONG. REC. 18863 (1971); S. 2581, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
117 CONG. REC. 33433 (1971).
22. See Fisher, supra note 8, at 128-29; Miller, supra note 8, at 533.
23. See 1973 Hearings 365 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral).
24. E.g., the political question, standing and sovereign immunity doctrines.
25. Only three courts have so held. See Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258
(C.D. Cal. 1973); Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
San Francisco Redevelopment Agency v. Nixon, 329 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
26. City of New York v. Train, No. 73-1705 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 1974), afj'g City of
New York v. Ruckelshaus, 358 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973) (Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972); State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099
(8th Cir. 1973), a!f'g 347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mo. 1972) (Federal Aid Highway Act
of 1956); Community Action Program Executive Directors Ass'n v. Ash, 365 F. Supp.
1355 (D. N.J. 1973) (Economic Opportunity Act of 1964); Seafarers Int'l Union v.
Weinberger, 363 F. Supp. 1053 (D.D.C. 1973) (Public Health Service Hospitals);
Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973) (urban housing program sub-
sidies); Pealo v. Farmers Home Administration, 361 F. Supp. 1320 (D.D.C. 1973)
(rural housing program subsidies); National Council of Community Mental Health
Centers v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C. 1973) (Community Mental Health
Centers Act); Campaign Clean Water v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Va.),
rev'd and remanded for evidentiary hearing, Campaign Clean Water v. Train, No.
73-1745 (4th Cir. Dec. 10, 1973) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972); Oklahoma v. Weinberger, 360 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Okla. 1973) (Library
Services and Construction Act of 1956); Minnesota v. Weinberger, 359 F. Supp. 789
(D. Minn. 1973) (Social Security Act Amendments); Minnesota Chippewa Tribe v.
Carlucci, 358 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1973) (Indian Education Act of 1972); Local
2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973)
(Economic Opportunity Act of 1964); Berends v. Butz, 357 F. Supp. 143 (D. Minn.
1973) (Agricultural Act of 1961 emergency loan program); Pennsylvania v. Wein-
berger, Civil No. 1606-73 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 1973) (Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act of 1965); Louisiana v. Weinberger, Civil No. 73-1763 (E.D. La. Nov. 30,
1973) (National Defense Education Act of 1958); Pennsylvania v. Weinberger, Civil
No. 1125-73 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 1973) (Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, Vocational Education Act of 1963, Adult Education Act of 1966); National
League for Nursing v. Ash, Civil No. 1316-73 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1973) (Nurse Training
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one27 cases recently brought before them, and have failed to decide on the
merits in only three 28 of those actions.
B. The Constitutional Issue
The basic contention of the Administration is that the executive has inher-
ent power to impound funds, regardless of congressional intent or statutory
language mandating spending.29  In support, spokesmen cite the "inherent"
power of the President under the Constitution.3"
The Constitution makes no specific mention of impoundment, thus any
executive power to impound needs to be implied from the document.
Act of 1971); Am. Ass'n of Colleges of Podiatric Medicine v. Ash, Civil No. 1139-73
(D.D.C. Oct. 26, 1973) (Public Health Service Act); Illinois ex rel. Bakalis v. Wein-
berger, No. 73 C 1642 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 1973) (National Defense Education Act of
1958); Washington v. Weinberger, Civil No. 410-73C2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 1973)
(National Defense Education Act of 1958); Texas v. Fri, Civil No. A-73-CA-38 (D.
Tex. Oct. 2, 1973) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972);
Massachusetts v. Weinberger, Civil No. 1308-73 (D.D.C. July 26, 1973) (National
Defense Education Act of 1958); Martin-Trigona v. Ruckelshaus, No. 72 c 3044
(N.D. 111. June 29, 1973) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972); Bennet v. Butz, No. 4-73 Civ 258 (D. Minn. June 28, 1973) (Food Stamp
Act of 1964); Minnesota v. Fri, No. 4-73 Civ 133 (D. Minn. June 25, 1973) (Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972). See generally Williams v.
Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973).
27. Plaintiffs were granted no relief in Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258
(C.D. Cal. 1973) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972);
Local 2816, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ill.
1973) (Economic Opportunity Act of 1964); Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F.
Supp, 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (urban renewal funds) and San Francisco Redevelopment
Authority v. Nixon, 329 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (urban renewal funds). In
Campaign Clean Water v. Train, No. 73-1745 (4th Cir. Dec. 10, 1973) the district
court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff was reversed and remanded for
further fact finding. The court did not deny that the impoundment might be illegal,
but disagreed that there was an adequate evidentiary basis for the lower court's con-
clusion that the executive's action arbitrarily frustrated legislative policy. Slip op. at
18. The opinion noted, however, that
[w]hen the executive exercises its responsibility under appropriate legislation
in such a manner as to frustrate the Congressional purpose, either by abso-
lute refusal to spend or by a withholding of so substantial an amount as to
make impossible the attainment of the legislative goal, the executive trespasses
beyond the range of its legal discretion. Slip op. at 16-17.
28. See cases cited note 25 supra.
29. 1973 Hearings 383 (testimony of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General);
1971 Hearings 148, 160-61 (testimony of Caspar Weinberger, Deputy Director, Office
of Management and Budget).
30. 1973 Hearings 368 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General).
Additional support is claimed from statutes, see- text accompanying notes 53-73 infra,
and from historical precedent. As noted above, see supra note 12, the historical record
is not conclusive. Even if it were,
[ilt may also be questioned whether the frequent exercise of a power unau-
thorized by law, by officers of the government, can ever by its frequency be
made to stand as a just foundation for the very authority which is thus as-
sumed.
The Floyd Acceptances, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 666, 677 (1869). See also Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952).
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According to Deputy Attorney General Joseph Sneed, the power is inherent
in the grant of power to the President in article II, § 1, vesting the execu-
tive power in the President. Government counsel have argued that:
Just as Congress has implied powers . . .so does the President
have implicit authority-under the executive power clause-in car-
rying out his constitutional obligation. ... Essentially, this con-
cept of "executive power" [is the] overall duty to run the
government responsibly and efficiently. 31
It is urged that to enable the President to fulfill his duty to responsibly and
efficiently run the government, he must have the ability to impound funds
appropriated by Congress. Without this power, "Presidential fiscal au-
thority could be rendered largely ineffective." '3 2
Any discussion of inherent presidential power must begin with the Su-
preme Court's landmark opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer.33 It was there argued that President Truman had inherent authority
to seize steel mills to prevent their shutdown by a strike during the Korean
War. Despite the broad authority normally granted to the executive in
matters of national defense during wartime,34 the Court held 6-3, that
the seizure was in excess of lawful executive authority. Justice Douglas'
concurrence addressed the claim of inherent powers under article II and
dismissed it, stating that "Article II which vests the 'executive Power' in the
President defines that power with particularity. '35  Although the multiple
opinions in Youngstown make it difficult to state with assurance the Court's
consensus, it seems reasonable to conclude that "the investiture of the ex-
ecutive power in the President combined with the 'faithful execution' gave
him no authority of a legislative nature."'36 An impoundment, however,
is clearly of a legislative nature, for it is an attempt to amend a congressional
determination of the amount necessary to achieve a specific policy objective.
When all funds for a program are impounded, it then results in an attempt to
unilaterally repeal a legislative enactment.
President Truman, prior to seizing the mills, had asked Congress for such
authority. Congress refused to grant that power. In its opinion, the Court
made note of congressional opposition to the grant of this power, 37 lending
credence to the theory that its holding was limited to cases which Congress
31. Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 15,
Pealo v. Farmers Home Administration, 361 F. Supp. 1320 (D.D.C. 1973).
32. Id.
33. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
34. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex Parte Endo,
323 U.S. 283 (1944).
35. 343 U.S. at 632 (Douglas, J. concurring).
36. Goostree, The Power of the Prosident To Impound Appropriated Funds: With
Special Reference to Grants In Aid To Segregated Activities, 11 AM. U.L. REv. 32,
40 (1962).
37. 343 U.S. at 586.
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had recently denied the President the power he later asserted. Although
some argue that the Youngstown holding was considerably broader,38 even
under the narrow interpretation set forth above a strong argument may
be made that Youngstown, by analogy, can be used to prohibit presidential
impounding.
Congress was asked, several months prior to the numerous impoundments
of early 1973, to grant the President the power to impound in order to re-
main within a proposed expenditure ceiling during fiscal year 1973.39 The
House agreed to give the President broad impoundment powers, 40 but the
Senate amended the bill to limit impoundments to not more than 10%
of any one program and to forbid the impounding of any funds for several fa-
vored programs. 41 The final version of the bill, however, did not give the
President an impoundment power, nor did it enact the proposed $250 bil-
lion expenditure ceiling.42  These facts are directly analogous to the situa-
tion in Youngstown. In both cases the President requested congressional
authority to take certain actions and in both cases Congress refused;
immediately thereafter the President undertook the actions without Con-
gress' approval. In Youngstown the Court held the executive's action
unconstitutional. Thus for the President to impound, after being re-
fused that authority by the Congress is, at least arguably, unconstitutional.
Moreover, claims of inherent constitutional authority to impound have
had difficulty finding adherents even within the Nixon Administration. In
1969, Justice William Rehnquist, then Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, wrote, in reference to the authority of the President to
impound funds for assistance to federally impacted schools:
With respect to the suggestion that the President has a constitutional
power to decline to spend appropriated funds, we must conclude
that existence of such broad power is supported by neither reason
nor precedent ....
It is in our view extremely difficult to formulate a constitu-
tional theory to justify a refusal by the President to comply with
a Congressional directive to spend . . . . [The President has no
mandate under the Constitution to determine national policy on
assistance to education independent from his duty to execute such
laws on the subject as Congress chooses to pass. 48
38. See Kauper, The Steel Seizure Cases: Congress, The President And The Supreme
Court, 51 MIcH. L. REv. 141 (1952).
39. H.R. 16810, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), 118 CONo. Rac. H 8800 (daily ed.
Sept. 26, 1972).
40. 118 CONG. REc. H 9402 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1972).
41. Id. at S 18051, 18082 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1972).
42. Pub. L. No. 92-599, 86 Stat. 1324 (Oct. 18, 1972).
43. 1973 Hearings 390, 393-95. (Memorandum Re Presidential Authority To Im-
pound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Federally Impacted Schools).
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The second prong of the executive's constitutional argument is based on
article II, § 3, which directs the President to "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." This provision, it is asserted, "authorizes and occa-
sionally requires that the President withhold funds."'44  The argument is
that pursuant to his duty to faithfully execute the laws, there are certain
laws 45 which must be executed while others may be ignored. 46  This is so
because:
[T]he Executive is confronted with apparently conflicting statu-
tory directives seeming to mandate spending, on the one hand,
and authorizing economy, on the other. In such situations, Con-
gress frequently has not anticipated the conflict, and the two stat-
utes must be harmonized based largely upon inferences as to
probable Congressional intention.47
In other words, to comply with some statutes, such as the debt limit, the
executive decides not to comply with other statutes, such as the various ap-
propriations bills.
The argument that the "faithful execution" clause48 permits the execu-
tive to execute some laws and ignore others was rejected by the Supreme
Court in 1838. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes49 involved the
Postmaster General's refusal to credit Stokes, a government mail contractor,
with payment and allowances which the Solicitor General, pursuant to an
explicit congressional directive, had authorized. In the course of issuing a
writ of mandamus to the Postmaster General, the Court, in dicta, noted the
contention that the executive may refuse to execute some laws pursuant to
the faithful execution clause and said that
[T]o contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see
the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their exe-
cution, is a novel construction of the Constitution, and entirely in-
admissible. 50
Kendall thus stands for the proposition that the executive may not constitu-
44. 1971 Hearings 95 (testimony of Caspar Weinberger, Deputy Director, Office of
Management and Budget).
45. The President, it is claimed, must execute the following laws: The Employ-
ment Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25 (1970) as amended 15 U.S.C.A. § 1026 (Supp.
1973); The Antideficiency Act of 1950, 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970); the Economic Stabi-
lization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-
210, 85 Stat. 743 (1971); and the public debt ceiling, 31 U.S.C. § 757b (1970), as
amended Pub. L. No. 92-599, 86 Stat. 1324 (1972).
46. This argument has been characterized as "absurd" by one commentator. Stas-
sen, supra note 8, at 1183. Another has noted that "the high Constitutional duty to
see that the laws are faithfully executed does not confer upon the President the dis-
cretion to determine what laws shall be executed and how much." Goostree, supra
note 36, at 39.
47. 1973 Hearings 366 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General).
48. U.S. CONST. art. IT, § 3.
49. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
50. Id. at 613.
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tionally refuse to spend funds which Congress has clearly directed be spent.
Although Kendall is not compelling precedent for a court faced with an im-
poundment case,5 1 it does give a further indication that there is little consti-
tutional support for the "faithful execution" argument. 52
Furthermore, if two laws are truly inconsistent, under the doctrine of
repeal by implication,5 2a the executive should enforce the more recent
and specific of the two. One may assume that Congress enacted the
current year's budget authority with full knowledge of the prior statute.
Therefore, a congressional approval of budget authority that would cause
the executive to violate another act may be seen as implicit authorization
that, to the extent the two acts are incompatible, the more recent act should
be faithfully executed.
C. Statutory Bases for Impoundment
Impoundments are also justified on the basis of the discretionary language
in the appropriations and authorizing statutes.53 Most appropriations stat-
utes do not on their face mandate expenditure of all funds appropriated,
nor do most authorizing statutes.5 4  It has thus often been thought that "an
appropriation is permissive rather than mandatory. '55
That the language of most statutes does not mandate full expenditure of the
entire amount appropriated cannot be refuted. But the inquiry into the le-
gality of impoundment does not end at this point, for as then Assistant Attor-
ney General William Rehnquist stated before Congress, "on the question of
trying to find a mandatory intent on the part of Congress, it is not a ques-
tion of looking for the word 'shall' as opposed to 'may'." 56  Instead, the
mandatory intent, if any, is to be construed from the overall language of
51. See 1973 Hearings 361-62 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney
General).
52. In Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60
(D.D.C. 1973) the court cited Kendall in the course of an opinion rejecting the execu-
tive's right to impound.
52a. "[W]here a conflict is readily seen by an application of the later enactment
it is clear that the later enactment is intended to supersede the existing law." J.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2012 at 463 (3d ed. F. Horack,
Jr. 1943).
53. 1973 Hearings 366 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General).
The Solicitor General has recently taken the position, however, that the executive may
impound even under a statute with mandatory wording. See Defendant's Application
for Stay Pending Appeal at 2 Lynn v. Pennsylvania, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973)
(filed in the U.S. Sup. Ct.).
54. But see The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, 23 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970).
"It is the sense of Congress that under existing law no part of any sums authorized
to be appropriated for expenditure . . . pursuant to the provisions of this title shall
be impounded or withheld from obligation."
55. Miller, supra note 8 at 511. But see Davis, Congressional Power To Require
Defense Expenditures, 33 FORD. L. Rav. 39, 55; Stassen, supra note 8 at 1181 n.117.
56. 1971 Hearings 234.
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the enabling statute, the authorization bill and the appropriations act. 57
This approach seems a preferable method of gauging the intent of Congress
to direct spending for a particular program. This analysis, however, will
not be helpful in every impoundment dispute, for legislation is often
silent on the question of its mandatory nature. This may be because
Congress has assumed that its approval of budget authority was an ade-
quate indication of its decision that the funds be expended.
The real question, however, is not whether the executive must spend the
full appropriation, nor is it whether Congress explicitly directed that he
do so. The issue is whether the executive may refuse to spend funds when
to do so would defeat congressional intent. Thus, a House committee has
written that "[t]here is no warrant or justification for the thwarting of a
major policy of Congress by the impounding of funds."" The President
may, therefore, impound funds when the purpose for which the funds were
provided has been fully accomplished. On the other hand, he may not im-
pound funds when to do so would limit the reach of a congressional pro-
gram.
5 9
Assuming arguendo that the permissive language of most appropriations
statutes permits impoundments which result in a failure to carry out con-
gressional intent, a question remains concerning the degree to which the
congressional will may be thwarted. Most recent impoundments have with-
held 50 to 100 percent of the program's budget authority. While Congress
may have been willing to accept equal reductions in many programs, 60 it
has not been willing to acquiesce in program reductions of this magnitude.
That the President may reduce a program by one-half or more arguably
follows from the assertion of a constitutional and statutory impounding pow-
er. Since the Constitution does not mention an impoundment power, it
obviously places no limit on its exercise. If, as contended, legislative ap-
propriations are permissive and "merely establish a spending ceiling, not a
floor,"'61 there is no reason why the President need spend anything for a
particular program.
Although the argument may be logically appealing, it fails to recognize
an important factor in our constitutional framework-the President's lack
of an item veto. An item veto would permit the President to disapprove
particular portions or "items" of an appropriations measure. Nearly all ap-
propriations are passed in the form of "omnibus" bills which include ap-
57. Id.
58. H.R. REP. No. 1797, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 311 (1950).
59. Davis, supra note 55, at 55; Stassen, supra note 8, at 1179.
60. See S. 373 93d Cong., 1st Sess. tit. II, § 202(b) (1973).
61. 1973 Hearings 841 (Department of Justice Answers to Questions Concerning Im-
pounding of Appropriated Funds Posed by Senator Ervin in His Letter of February
14, 1973, to the Deputy Attorney General).
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propriations for many distinct programs in different agencies and depart-
ments of the government. The executive must approve or disapprove the
omnibus appropriation in tot--he may not select portions to disapprove
while approving the balance. The power to impound, however, "amounts
to an item veto as well as a retroactive veto."'62 Such a power would make
a mockery of the legislative process by interfering with the normal give-and-
take between the executive and the legislature in the lawmaking process.
Congress would hesitate to negotiate with the executive over specific items
in an appropriations bill if the executive, after acceding to a congressional
request for increased budget authority for certain programs, were free to im-
pound the increased authority.
The only explicit statutory authority for executive impoundment is con-
tained in the Antideficiency Act. 63  It permits the executive to make ap-
portionments of funds to avoid end of year deficiencies, or when the
need arises for supplemental appropriations, to establish reserves with
savings made possible by changes in requirements, greater efficiency, or
other developments subsequent to the appropriation's enactment.
The Administration contends that the Act should be broadly construed to
include "inflationary pressures" among the developments subsequent to
the appropriation which justify an impoundment.6 4  But the language of
the Act and its legislative history indicate that reserves were not to be in-
stituted as a means to combat inflation.65 The Act states that reserves
may be established only when the funds "will not be required to carry out
the purposes of the appropriation concerned." 66  Furthermore, the legisla-
tive history shows that the apportionment tool "was to be a means of carry-
ing out an activity, within the amount appropriated by Congress, rather
than an instrument for curtailing or abolishing an activity."67
The Administration also asserts that the Employment Act of 194668
grants it authority to impound69 in order to control inflation which, in
turn, furthers the Act's purpose of "promot[ing] maximum employment,
production and purchasing power. '70
A recent Senate Committee report analyzed the executive's contention
and concluded that "[ulse of the Employment Act to justify impounding
funds . . . violates both the spirit and the letter of the Act."'7' The Act
62. Stassen, supra note 8, at 1205.
63. 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970).
64. S. REP. No. 93-121, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1973).
65. Id. at 5.
66. 31 U.S.C. § 665(c)(2) (1970).
67. S. REP. No. 93-121, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
68. 15 U.S.C. H9 1021-25 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1026 (Supp. 1973).
69. 1973 Hearings 366 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney General).
70. 15 U.SC. § 1021 (1970).
71. S. REP. No. 93-121, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1973).
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is merely a general policy statement that the Federal Government pro-
mote "employment, production, and purchasing power." It does not grant
any substantive impoundment power to the President. 72  Moreover, im-
poundments can be viewed as a violation of the Act, for they reduce em-
ployment and production by withdrawing funds from the economy. 73
If. Attempted Judicial Resolution
In late 1972 and early 1973, the President ordered the impoundment of
nearly $18 billion earmarked for a variety of domestic programs.74 Shortly
thereafter, plaintiffs75 challenged the impoundments in federal courts through-
out the nation. The judiciary was then, for the first time, presented with
the issue of the legality of executive impoundments of funds. The collec-
tive judicial answer to this question was clear-the President, unless he
has been authorized by statute to do so, may not impound.76
The Eighth Circuit in State Highway Commission of Missouri v. Volpe77
was the first appellate court to rule on the impoundment question.
The Secretary of Transportation impounded $21.9 million of Missouri's
$115.7 million apportionment under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1956.78 In affirming the district court's 70 grant of an injunction and a de-
claratory judgment ordering the release of the funds, the court set forth
the decisional approach that has been followed by the lower courts.80 The
question involved, the court stated, was one of statutory construction, rather
than constitutional interpretation."1 After analyzing the statute,8 2 the court
72. The original version of the Act did grant discretionary spending authority to
the President. The final version omitted this power. Id. at 8.
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 26 and 27.
75. Plaintiffs were either individual beneficiaries of the program whose funds had
been impounded, see, e.g., Pealo v. Farmers Home Administration, 361 F. Supp. 1320
(D.D.C. 1973); or governmental or institutional sponsors of activities financed by the
impounded funds, see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973).
76. A preliminary question, of course, was whether the court possessed jurisdiction
over suits challenging impoundments. The executive argued that anti-impoundment
suits involved non-justiciable political quesions for which the plaintiffs lacked standing
to challenge and which, at any event, were barred by the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity. See 1973 Hearings 365 (statement of Joseph T. Sneed, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral). Although this procedural argument has been more successful than those based
upon the merits of the claimed right to impound, see supra note 28, it too has been
overwhelmingly rejected by the lower courts.
77. 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
78. 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-44 (1970), as amended, 23 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-44 (Supp. 1973).
79. 347 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
80. But see Pealo v. Farmers Home Administration, 361 F. Supp. 1320 (D.D.C.
1973 (semble); Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973) (semble).
81. The court stated that
[t]he fundamental issue is whether the Secretary possesses direct or implied
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concluded that it found
nothing within these provisions of the Act which explicitly or im-
pliedly allows the Secretary to withhold approval of construction
projects for reasons remote and unrelated to the Act.83
In adopting a statutory approach, the lower courts have implicitly follow-
ed the Supreme Court's direction that
a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the con-
text of the whole Act, and that in fulfilling our responsibility in
interpreting legislation, 'we are not guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law,
and to its object and policy.'84
Once this decisional approach was adopted, the answer to the question
of the executive's right to impound was preordained. Congress does not
pass legislation in the expectation that funds appropriated pursuant to the
authorizing act will not be spent. It fully intends that its laws will be execu-
ted by the President. Thus, under this scheme, the sole inquiry becomes one
of finding a legislative intent that the program be carried out.
This approach, with few exceptions," has resulted in holdings that
the executive may not impound at will. Given the limited scope of in-
quiry under this method, the result could hardly be otherwise. Neverthe-
less, to presume, as the courts have, that there is no statutory power to im-
pound unless granted by Congress, is surely sound. If Congress wished to
grant the President the power to impound funds it could easily do so by ex-
plicitly granting him that authority, as it has in the past.86 Further, courts
authority to exercise contract controls . . . such authority, if it exists at all,
must be gleaned from the language of the Act itself. 479 F.2d at 1111.
The District of Columbia Circuit apparently agrees with this approach. See City of
New York v. Train, No. 73-1705 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 1974).
82. 479 F.2d at 1111-14. The court was also persuaded by the Act's legislative
history. Id. at 1114-15. The House report on the 1970 amendments said that:
[t]he withholding of highway trust funds as an anti-inflationary measure is a
clear violation of the intent of Congress. . . . We again wish to emphasize
the clear legislative intent that funds appropriated shall not be impounded or
withheld from obligation.
H.R. REP. No. 91-1554, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
5401 (1970).
83. 479 F.2d at 1114.
84. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1961). See 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2802 at 215 (3d ed. F. Horack, Jr. 1943).
85. Housing Authority v. HUD, 340 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The court,
however, dismissed the suit on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding
that the action was an unconsented suit against the sovereign which raised non-justiciable
political questions. In Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258 (C.D. Cal. 1973) the
court dismissed the action for lack of standing, but went on to state that the statute
did not require the allotment of all authorized funds.
86. Congress most recently gave the President explicit authority to impound in the
Revenue Expenditure and Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-364, tit. II, 82 Stat.
270 (1968). The Act permitted the President to impound to keep federal spending
below $180.1 billion in fiscal 1969. See also S. 373, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. tit. II, § 202(a)
(1973).
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should not infer from congressional silence that Congress has abandoned its
constitutionally granted power over the purse.
While focusing on the statutory question, the courts have rarely dis-
cussed the constitutional aspects of the issue. Although it is understandable
for lower courts to rely on a statutory rather than a constitutional basis for
their decisions, it hardly aids in the resolution of the present crisis. So long
as courts refrain from holding that impoundment is constitutionally prohib-
ited, the executive will continue to impound while arguing that each statute
under which funds are withheld grants discretion to impound. The judiciary
may continue to rule that neither the statute nor the legislative history in-
dicates any such discretion, but executive impoundments might nevertheless
continue. Until the constitutionality of impounding is decided, Congress
would never be certain whether its acts would be carried out, and the
executive would be unable to prepare the nation's budget with a reasonable
degree of certainty.
A decision defining the constitutional parameters of the executive's im-
poundment power is clearly necessary. Lower court impoundment de-
cisions have prepared the issue for its final resolution, but they have been
unable to provide a solution. That can only be accomplished by the
Supreme Court.
II. Proposed Legislative Solutions
While Congress has encouraged attempts at a judicial resolution of the im-
poundment controversy,87 it has not been content to leave the question solely
to the judiciary. Shortly after the extent to which the Nixon Administration
was impounding funds became apparent to Congress, a Senate subcommit-
tee held hearings in 1971.188 Various bills were introduced,sS and after
further hearings in 197390 legislation to gain a congressional voice in im-
poundment began to receive serious consideration.
Two different approaches have been considerd. An example of one of
them is contained in the Senate version of S. 373. That bill requires the
President to send a message9' to Congress and to the Comptroller General
within ten days after he or various other executive branch officials orders,
approves or permits impoundment of any budget authority. A notice of
the impoundment would also have to appear in the Federal Register within
87. Twenty-seven members of Congress appeared as amici curiae in State Highway
Commission v. Volpe, urging affirmance of the district court's order to release the funds
impounded.
88. 1971 Hearings.
89. See supra note 20.
90. See supra note 21.
91. S. 373, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1973).
[Vol. 23: 359
Impoundment of Funds
ten days. 92
The significant provision is contained in Section 3 which directs that the
impoundment "shall cease ...within sixty calendar days of continuous
session after the message is received by Congress unless the specific im-
poundment shall have been ratified by the Congress by passage of a con-
current resolution.'' 93 In addition, the Congress reserves the right to dis-
approve, by concurrent resolution, an impoundment, or any part thereof,
prior to the end of the sixty-day period. A congressional disapproval
makes mandatory the obligation of the impounded budget authority and pre-
cludes its re-impoundment. Section 5 provides for an expedited procedure
for consideration of the concurrent resolution approving or disapproving
the impoundment. Title II authorizes a ceiling on expenditures during
fiscal 1974 while allowing the executive to reserve (i.e., impound) funds
to remain within the ceiling. Any reservations, however, must be made
proportionately from each functional and subfunctional budget category,
thus preserving congressional budget priorities. 94
The other legislative approach is embodied in the House legislation, H.R.
848 0.9 That bill is substantially similar to the Senate's with the exception
that Section 102 provides that any impoundment shall cease only if either
House of Congress has disapproved the impoundment by a resolution en-
acted within sixty days of receipt of the President's impoundment message.
This difference is obviously of great significance, for it shifts the bur-
den of approval and disapproval. While the House bill would approve an
impoundment if neither house acted, the Senate version would ratify an im-
poundment only when a majority in both House and Senate voted in its
favor. To disapprove impoundments under the Senate's proposal would
require only inaction by either body. The House bill, on the other hand,
necessitates the votes of a majority of either body to reject an impound-
ment. Since it is always easier for the Congress to sit idly by rather than
pass the necessary resolution, the ultimate result will be that fewer impound-
ments will be sustained under the Senate version.
If the purpose of anti-impoundment legislation is to preserve Congress'
power of the purse, then the Senate bill is surely stronger.96 For to require,
92. Id. at § 2(f). Similar reporting requirements are presently mandated by the
Federal Impoundment and Information Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 581c-1 (Supp. 1973).
93. Emphasis added.
94. No funds may be reserved from funds approved for interest payments, veterans
benefits and services, social security trust funds, public assistance and maintenance
grants, food stamps, military retirement pay, medicaid and judicial salaries. S. 373,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(b) (1973). These exemptions comprise an estimated 70
per cent of the total federal budget. See H.R. REP. No. 93-336, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 21
(1973) (separate views of Congressman Anderson).
95. 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
96. But see Hearings on H.R. 5193 and Related Bills Before the Comm. on Rules
19731
Catholic University Law Review
as the House bill does, that a new majority be obtained to reject an im-
poundment will result in greater ease of executive impoundment. It is
questionable whether an approval of budget authority which has previously
passed both houses should be required to pass one of those houses a second
time. This becomes obvious when an impoundment message is viewed in its
true form-as an amendment to an existing law. Any other amendment
would need the approval of both legislative bodies to be enacted, rather
than the disapproval of one. No apparent reason has been shown to justify
treating impoundments differently from other proposed amendments. The
Senate bill recognizes this and requires the President, if he desires to ask
congressional authorization before impounding, to submit legislation in the
form of a supplemental appropriations bill, subject to the committee system
and approval of both houses. The House bill lacks these provisions and is
significantly weaker for its ommission.
Regardless of which anti-impoundment bill emerges from Congress, the
issue will remain alive. Administration spokesmen have warned that the
President will veto any legislation which, in his opinion, deters the exercise
of his constitutional right to impound. 97
IV. Conclusion
The dispute over impoundment is a serious one which fundamentally threat-
ens the balance of power within the federal government, and, as such,
requires a certain and immediate resolution. Whether it will quickly be
resolved is unclear. As stated above, attempts to legislate a solution seem
destined to fail. Nor has an attempted judicial resolution proved suc-
cessful thus far. Even though the courts have been nearly unanimous in
their rejection of the President's asserted power to impound, the Adminis-
tration has not receded from its claim.
In light of the inability of Congress or the lower courts to resolve the is-
sue, a decision by the Supreme Court, explaining and delineating the
bounds of the impoundment power, is sorely needed. For so long as the
President continues to impound, Congress will be deprived of its rightful
role as an equal partner in the federal budget-making process.
Neil M. Soltman
of the House of Representatives on Impoundment Reporting and Review, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973) passim; Maass, Anti-Impoundment: The House Bill Is Better, The
Washington Post, Aug. 30, 1973, § A, at 19, col. 2.
97. Impounding Is Reaffirmed, The Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1973, § A, at 1,
col. 1, at 17, col. 3.
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